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Capitalizing on the most recent estimates of agricultural price distortions in China and in 
other countries, this paper assesses the economic and poverty impact of global and domestic 
trade reform in China. It also examines the interplay between the trade reforms and factor 
market reforms aimed at improving the allocation of labor within the Chinese economy. The 
results suggest that trade reforms in the rest of the world, land reform and hukou reform all 
serve to reduce poverty, while unilateral trade reforms result in a small poverty increase. 
Agricultural distortions are important factors in determining the distributional and poverty 
effects of trade reform packages, although their impacts on aggregate trade and welfare 
appear to be small. A comprehensive reform package which bundles the reforms in 
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As the most populous nation in the world, China plays a critical role in the determination of 
the global poverty headcount. Indeed a considerable portion of the reduction in the latter can 
be attributable to the remarkable reduction in poverty incidence in China over the past two 
decades. Chen and Ravallion (2004) find that, in 1981, 65 percent of the population in China 
was in extreme ($1/day) poverty, whereas by 2001, this figure had fallen to nearly 12 percent. 
These authors show that much of this poverty reduction was driven by reforms in the 
agricultural sector. These advances notwithstanding, rural poverty continues to dominate the 
national poverty headcount in China, and the headcount is highest among households which 
are specialized in farming. Furthermore, there is evidence that, despite rapid economic 
growth, the rural-urban wage gap is widening (Sicular et al. 2007). And within the rural 
sector, rapid non-agricultural income growth and slow agricultural income growth since the 
1990s is contributing to increased rural inequality (Benjamin et al. 2007). Therefore, the 
agricultural sector continues to play an important role in the determination of national 
poverty and inequality in China. In this chapter, we focus on the impact of agricultural, trade 
and rural policy reforms – both at home and abroad – on poverty and inequality in China.  
  The impact of trade reforms on poverty and inequality in China has been a topic of 
intense research over the past decade, culminating in a number of studies focusing on the 
impact of China’s accession to the WTO on poverty (e.g., see Bhattasali, Li and Martin 
2004). Chen and Ravallion (2004) examine these impacts at a highly disaggregate level using 
earnings and price estimates from another study, and estimate that WTO accession will 
benefit urban households – particularly poor urban households. However, their prediction of 
the impact of WTO accession on rural households is that falling rural wages and increases in 
consumer prices for these households are likely to hurt the rural poor. In a companion study, 
Hertel, Zhai and Wang (2004) aggregate households to a greater degree, but incorporate them 2 
 
directly into their CGE model of China. They, too, conclude that WTO accession would be 
relatively more favorable for urban households, but they argue that whether or not rural 
households will lose from these reforms depends critically on the degree of off-farm labor 
mobility. At low (or zero) mobility, as assumed by Chen and Ravallion, the poorest rural 
households lose from reform but, as the off-farm labor supply elasticity rises, the potential for 
farm households to gain increases.  
  In closely related work, Hertel and Zhai (2006) contrast the impacts of commodity 
market reforms, such as those initiated under China’s WTO accession, with factor market 
reforms aimed at facilitating an improved flow of labor out of agriculture and between the 
rural and urban markets. They find that the latter can result in significant gains for rural 
households. Specifically, those authors explore the implications of (a) reforming agricultural 
land markets to permit arms-length land rental in all rural areas, thereby facilitating the 
permanent movement of labor out of farming, (b) enhancing off-farm labor mobility, and (c) 
abolishing the hukou system, thereby reducing the transaction costs imposed on rural–urban 
migrants. When combined, these reforms reduce the estimated 2007 urban-rural income ratio 
from 2.58 (in the absence of WTO accession) to 2.09. When WTO accession is additionally 
added to this mix of policy reforms, the 2007 urban-rural income ratio is still reduced – but 
not quite as much – to 2.12. Given the importance of the labor market distortions for poverty 
and inequality in China, we pay special attention to their presence in this study as well. 
  In this chapter we update the model used in earlier studies (to reflect the most recent 
Chinese Social Accounting Matrix) and capitalize on the most recent estimates of agricultural 
price distortions which have changed significantly since China’s accession to the WTO. We 
also bring to bear new farm price distortions estimates for other developing countries,
1 in 
order to make an assessment of the impact of global trade reform on poverty and inequality in 
China. Unlike our earlier work, which focused solely on China’s own reforms associated with 
WTO accession, here we explore the impacts of reforms in the rest of the world as well as in 
China. Additionally, we decompose these impacts in two ways: first by region (China versus 
the rest of the world), and secondly by sector (agriculture versus non-agriculture). We also 
examine the interplay between these commodity market reforms and factor market reforms 
aimed at improving the allocation of labor within the Chinese economy. 
                                                           
1 Estimates of agricultural protection/assistance for China, based on Huang et al. (2009), are incorporated in the World 
Bank’s global agricultural distortions database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). Those estimates cover five decades, but 
the representative values for developing country agriculture as of 2004 that are used in the global CGE modeling for this 
study are summarized in Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). 3 
 
  This chapter is organized as follows: the next section describes the specification of the 
CGE model used in this study. We then assess the impact of eliminating agricultural price 
distortions in rest of the world, as well as reducing China’s own distortions in commodity and 
factor markets, on China’s macro-economy, agricultural production and poverty. The final 
section offers conclusions.  
 
 




The Chinese model used in this study is an updated version of the household-disaggregated 
CGE model which we used to study the economic and poverty effects of WTO accession and 
Doha round trade liberalization on China (Hertel, Zhai and Wang 2004, Hertel and Zhai 
2006, Zhai and Hertel 2006). The model has its intellectual roots in the group of single-
country, applied general equilibrium models used over the past two decades to analyze the 
impact of trade policy reform. The updated version in this chapter has a more recent 
benchmark dataset based on 2002 Chinese Input/Output table and a very detailed sectoral 





Following our previous work, we disaggregate rural and urban households into 40 rural and 
60 urban representative households according to their primary source of income and relative 
income level. In light of the fact that the focus here is on agricultural incentives, we seek to 
highlight those households that depend exclusively on farming for their incomes. 
Accordingly, we stratify the rural households by agriculture-specialized (more than 95 
percent of household income from farming) and diversified (all other). We are also interested 
in the impacts of restrictions on rural-urban labor mobility, so we separately identify urban 
households and group them into three strata: transfer-specialized, labor-specialized and 
diversified. Within each stratum, we order households from poorest to richest, based on per 
capita income, and then group them into 20 vingtiles, each containing 5 percent of the 
stratum population.  4 
 
Household income derives from labor income, profits from family-owned agricultural 
and non-agricultural enterprises, property income and transfers. Households consume goods 
and services according to a preference structure determined by the Extended Linear 
Expenditure System (ELES). Through specification of a subsistence quantity of each good or 
service, this expenditure function generates non-homothetic demands, whereby the larger the 
relative importance of subsistence consumption (e.g., it would be high for rice, and low for 
automobiles) the more income-inelastic the household’s demand for that good.  
The other important dimension of household behavior is the supply of labor to off-farm 
activities. In China, the off-farm labor supply decision is complicated by institutional factors 
which have been built into the system in order to keep the agricultural population in place, 
among which the rural land tenure system is one of most widely-discussed (Zhao 1999b). The 
absence of well-defined land tenure has served to raise the opportunity cost of leaving the 
farm (Yang 1997). Households that cease to farm the land may lose the rights to it, so they 
have a strong incentive to continue some level of agricultural activity, even when profitability 
is quite low (Zhao 1999a). With only modest growth in rural, non-farm activities, this 
seriously limits the ability of households to obtain off-farm work (Zhao 1999b).
2 Although an 
active land rental market has emerged in some regions in recent years, the overall level of 
land rental transactions is still low, with around 10-15 percent of rural households renting 
land in/out (Deininger and Jin 2005, 2007, Wang, Herzfel and Glauben 2007). Empirical 
studies have found that the transaction costs associated with land rental are significant, and 
the absence of an efficient land rental market remains a substantial barrier to the facilitation 
of off-farm participation of rural labors (Deininger and Jin 2005, Wang, Herzfel and Glauben 
2007).  
In this study we model rural households as maximizing the total return to their labor 
supply, which is offered in both the on-farm and off-farm labor markets. However, the ability 
of households to shift labor between these two labor markets is constrained by a number of 
factors including education, experience, and simple geography, which can serve to isolate 
farm households from the non-farm labor market. We proxy the combined impact of these 
factors with a single, finite, constant elasticity of transformation (CET). The labor allocation 
between farm and off-farm jobs is determined by the ratio of the shadow value of labor in 
agriculture, relative to the off-farm wage rate, and this elasticity of transformation.
3 The CET 
                                                           
2 However, as noted by Parish, Zhe and Li (1995), the rural labor market is looking more like an open market all the time. 
3 See Hertel and Zhai (2006) for details of off-farm labor supply behavior in the model. 5 
 
parameter governs the off-farm labor supply elasticity, for which we adopt the estimate of 
2.67 by Sicular and Zhao (2004) as the overall farm/off-farm transformation elasticity for the 
total rural labor force. The empirical study by Zhang, Huang and Rozelle (2002) suggests that 
this elasticity increases by 0.58 for an additional year of schooling. This is translated into the 
farm/off-farm transformation elasticity of 0.68 for unskilled labor and 4.01 for semi-skilled 
labor.
4 
Owing to the absence of an effectively functioning land market, the shadow value of 
labor in agriculture in this function takes into account the potential impact which reducing 
agricultural employment will have on the household’s claim to farm land. This incremental 
factor is calculated as the marginal value product of land, multiplied by the probability that 
the household will lose its land as a result of off-farm migration. In order to make this 
amenable to use in a model of the representative farm household, with continuously variable 
labor and land use, we translate this probability into a simple elasticity of land income with 
respect to on-farm labor. The higher this elasticity, the greater the probability that the farmer 
will lose his land if he shifts to an off-farm job. The benchmark elasticity in our model is 0.5, 
that is, a ten percent reduction in on-farm work results in a 5 percent loss of land income.
 
However, for purposes of sensitivity analysis we also report results from two extreme 
simulations. In the first, the elasticity of land income with respect to off-farm work is zero. 
This is the case of a perfectly functioning land rental market with no chance of land loss. In 
the second sensitivity analysis, the elasticity is set equal to one, such that the farmer leaving 
his farm to work in the city is virtually guaranteed of losing his land. By comparing these two 





Migration is a key part of the rural economy in China. According to rural household survey 
data collected in 2003 and compiled by Liu, Park and Zhao (2006), 19.4 percent of all rural 
workers participated in migratory work in that year, and more than 40 percent of all 
households had at least one member who was a migrant in 2003. More than half of the 
migrants left their province, and most of these migrated to the coastal provinces where 
                                                           
4 Given the very small number of skilled farm workers in China, this segment is ignored in our analysis. See Zhai and Hertel 
(2006) for details of the derivation of the off-farm labor supply elasticity. 6 
 
manufacturing activity and exports have been booming. The 2000 census estimated that the 
total number of migrants in China was 131 million, of which nearly two-thirds were non-
hukou migrants. (Households without the hukou urban registration face limited access to 
many of urban amenities, including housing and education.) Rural-urban migration was the 
largest form of migration and amounted to more than 50 million in the 2000 census (Cai, 
Park and Zhao 2007). This massive migration is a rational response to the enormous rural-
urban wage gap that exists in China, which Sicular et al. (2007) recently placed at 2.27 (the 
ratio of urban to rural per capita disposable income in 2002) after adjusting for housing 
subsidies and spatial price differences. Remarkably, they find no evidence of this gap 
declining. Indeed, if anything, the ratio of urban to rural incomes appears to have risen 
slightly between 1997 and 2002. This is hardly the outcome that a standard, general 
equilibrium model with perfect labor mobility would predict! Clearly there are some 
important barriers to labor movement in China that need to be considered if one hopes to 
accurately assess the impact of commodity market reforms on rural and urban employment, 
wages and household income.  
While the rural-urban per capita income gap is an indication of a potential labor market 
distortion, what we really want to know is the hourly wage differential for workers of 
comparable skill and ability. If there were no barriers to the movement of labor between rural 
and urban areas, we would expect real wages to be equalized for an individual worker with 
given characteristics. Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002) explore the question of rural-urban 
inequality in greater detail for nine different provinces using the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). The authors conclude that the apparent labor market distortion is about 42 
percent of the rural-urban labor income differential and 48 percent of the hourly earnings 
differential.
5 When applied to their estimated average wage differential, this amounts to an ad 
valorem rate of apparent transactions “tax” on rural wages of 81 percent.
6 
  We model these transactions costs as real costs that are assumed by the temporary rural 
migrants who move to the urban areas without hukou urban registration. Of course these 
migrants are heterogeneous and the extent of the burden varies widely. Those individuals 
who are single and live close to the urban area in which they are working are likely to 
                                                           
5 There are likely other, unobserved factors inducing this rural-urban wage differential, in which case estimation of the labor 
market distortion via subtraction of known factors is biased in the direction of overstating the hukou-related distortion. 
Therefore, it is useful to also estimate the direct impact of household registration status on the observed wage difference 
among households. Shi (2002) takes this approach to the problem, using the same CHNS data set. He finds that only 28 
percent of the rural-urban wage difference can be explained directly via the coefficient on the hukou registration variable. 
This is quite a bit less than the 48 percent left unexplained via the subtraction approach of Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002).  
6 See Hertel and Zhai (2006) for a detailed description of how this ad valorem distortion is obtained. 7 
 
experience minor inconvenience as a result of this temporary migration. We expect them to 
be the first to migrate (ceteris paribus) in response to higher urban wages. On the other hand, 
some migrants have large families and come from a great distance. Their urban living 
conditions are often very poor and it is not uncommon for them to be robbed on the train 
when they are returning home after their work. For such individuals, the decision to migrate 
temporarily is likely to be a marginal one – and one which they may or may not choose to 
repeat. With this heterogeneous population in mind, we postulate a transactions cost function 
that is increasing in the proportion of the rural population engaged in temporary work. This 
transactions cost function has a simple, constant elasticity functional form, which begins at 
the origin, reflecting those migrants for whom there is essentially no cost due to their 
proximity to urban areas, and reaches the observed wage gap (adjusted for transport and 
living costs) at the current level of temporary migration (about 70 million workers). We 
assume that further increases in temporary migration have only a modest impact on these 
transactions costs.
7 Finally, it is important to note that only a portion of these observed 
transactions costs can be attributed to the government’s formal policy of migration restriction 
– the hukou system. Indeed, Shi (2002) finds that only 28 percent of the rural-urban wage 
difference can be explained directly via the coefficient on the hukou registration variable. We 
will take this into account later in our study, when we investigate the implications of the 
Chinese government undertaking labor market reforms. 
 
Production and trade 
 
Production in each of the sectors of the economy is modeled using nested constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functions, and constant returns to scale is assumed. In the top level of 
the nest, value-added and a composite of intermediate inputs produce outputs. Then a further 
CES function disaggregates the value-added into capital-labor composite and agricultural 
land. Capital-labor composite is further split into the capital-skilled labor composite and the 
aggregated less-skilled labor. The capital-skilled labor composite consists of capital and 
skilled labor, while aggregated less-skilled labor is composed of semi-skilled labor and 
unskilled labor. A low substitution elasticity of 0.3 between capital and skilled labor is 
assumed here to introduce the capital-skill complementarity. The elasticity of substitution 
between semi-skilled labor and unskilled labor is set to 1.5, based on estimates for the United 
                                                           
7 We assume that a doubling of temporary migration would only increase the marginal cost of migration by 10 percent. 8 
 
States by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Heckman and Lochner (1998).   
Each sector employs a labor composite comprising both rural and urban labor that 
substitute imperfectly. This is an indirect means of building into the model a geographic 
flavor, since some sectors will be located largely in urban areas while others will be 
predominantly in rural areas. By limiting the substitutability of rural and urban labor in each 
sector, we are able to proxy the economic effect of geographically distributed activity. Ideally 
we would model the geographic distribution of industrial activity, but unfortunately the data 
do not exist to support this split.  
All commodity and factor markets are assumed to clear through prices. In the case of 
rural labor markets, there is a segmentation between agricultural and non-agricultural labor: 
these two markets are linked imperfectly through the CET parameter discussed previously. 
Once transactions costs associated with temporary migration are accounted for, rural wages 
are equated with urban wages. Capital is assumed to be fully mobile across sectors. Import 
demand is modeled using the Armington assumption, i.e. domestic products are assumed to 
be differentiated from foreign products. On the export side, it is assumed that the firms treat 
domestic and export markets equally. Thus the law of one price holds, that is, the export price 
is identical to that of domestic supply. The small country assumption is assumed for imports 
and so world import prices are exogenous in terms of foreign currency. Exports are 
demanded according to constant-elasticity demand curves. Therefore the terms of trade for 
China are endogenous in the simulations. The value of export demand and Armington 
elasticities are based on the elasticities used in the global CGE model LINKAGE (van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005).  
 
The benchmark data 
 
A Chinese social accounting matrix (SAM) is estimated for the year 2002 to serve as the 
benchmark data set for model calibration. The SAM contains 48 sectors of production and 
100 representative households, based on the 2000 household survey data for three provinces 
(Guangdong, Sichuan, and Liaoning) and the most recent 2002 Input-Output table. Since the 
2002 Input-Output table has only one crop sector and one livestock sector, we disaggregate 
these two sectors into eight crop sectors and four livestock sectors according to the 
corresponding GTAP sector classification (Hertel 1997). The information about the structure 
of production, demand, inputs and trade from GTAP database version 7.0 are used for the 9 
 
sectoral disaggregation and we employ the cross-entropy method to balance the SAM (see 
Robinson, Cattaneo, and El-Said 2001).  
The base year tariffs and export subsidies/taxes are reported Table 1. Protection rates for 
lightly processed food and agricultural products are obtained from Huang et al. (2009) and 
from the GTAP database, version 7.0. For other primary goods and manufacturing products, 
tariffs are estimated based on collected revenue of import tariffs and base year imports by 
commodities. As shown in Table 1, China’s tariff structure provides more protection for food 
and agricultural products than non-food manufacturing goods. Moreover, the import tariff 
rates show considerable cross-sector variation within agriculture: vegetables and fruits, 
oilseeds and sugar cane and beet have high tariff rates of around 15 percent, while imports of 
plant-based fibers appear to be effectively subsidized.  
Columns 3-5 of Table 1 present China’s sectoral shares of GDP, exports and imports. 
Despite the diminishing importance of the agricultural sector in the Chinese economy over 
the last two decades, agriculture still accounts for 13.4 percent of GDP. Vegetables, fruits and 
livestock are key sources for agricultural value-added. Manufacturing value-added is 32 
percent of the economy-wide total. Chemicals, metals and machinery lead the way, followed 
by sectors related to electronics, textiles and apparel. Non-food manufacturing is very export 
intensive, accounting for 75 percent of Chinese exports. Electronics, textiles, apparel, 
chemicals and machinery are the major exporting sectors. These sectors also represent a 
relatively large share of imports, reflecting the significant presence of processing trade in 
China. On the other hand, China’s agricultural and food manufacturing sectors have very 
limited trade exposure. Agriculture accounts for only 1.6 percent of exports and 2.5 percent 
of imports. Vegetables and fruits are major agricultural exports while agricultural imports are 







To explore the implications of agricultural distortions at home and abroad for the Chinese 
economy, we consider six policy reform scenarios that eliminate various distortions in global 
trade and in China’s domestic commodity and factor markets. These scenarios are 
summarized in Table 2. The first two scenarios examine the effects of trade liberalization in 10 
 
the Rest of the World. ROW-Ag, considers the impact of agricultural liberalization in the 
form of elimination of import tariffs and export subsidies, as well as subsidies for domestic 
production, in agriculture and lightly processed food sectors in rest of the world. The second 
scenario involving Rest of World policies across all merchandise commodities (ROW) looks 
at a broader-based trade liberalization. It combines the removal of policy distortions in 
agricultural and lightly processed food sectors in Scenario 1 with tariff elimination for non-
agricultural goods in the rest of the world.  
We incorporate the impacts of trade reforms in the rest of the world in the Chinese CGE 
model through exogenous changes in import prices and export demands. The sizes of these 
exogenous trade shocks are obtained from the global CGE model Linkage, omitting China’s 
reforms in the process. Table 3 lists the external shocks imposed in the ROW and ROW-Ag 
scenarios.
8 It shows there are some enormous percentage increases in China’s agricultural 
and food export volumes (“export demand”) generated by the elimination of very high rates 
of protection elsewhere in Asia. Rice, other grain, vegetable and fruits, and refined sugar all 
show very large proportionate increases. Of course the associated output volume changes are 
often quite modest, as China is not a large exporter of most of these products (recall Table 1). 
China’s export volume declines in most livestock sectors, reflecting relatively smaller ROW 
barriers faced by its exporters in these sectors. 
China’s average export price increases by 2.4 percent while average import price 
increases by just 0.6 percent (both relative to the price of OECD manufacturing exports) in 
the case of a broad-based trade reform, indicating a gain in its terms of trade when other 
countries liberalize and China does not. However, given the relatively greater importance of 
manufacturing exports to China, if liberalization is confined to the agricultural sectors, the 
terms of trade improvement diminishes, with a 0.6 percent increase in average export price 
and 0.4 percent increase in average import price. The increase in sector export prices range 
from 1.8 to 4.5 percent in the case of broad-based trade liberalization and from 0.3 to 2.0 
percent in the case of agricultural liberalization only, with food and agricultural prices rising 
relative to non-food prices in both cases. 
The changes in China’s import prices show much greater sector variation. The import 
prices of most food and agricultural products rise more than non-food products, reflecting the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies in OECD countries. However, the world price of China’s 
oilseed imports declines by 2.8 and 2.3 percent, respectively, in these two scenarios, largely 
                                                           
8 Annex Table A.1 provides the mapping between 48 sectors in Chinese CGE model and 23 sectors in Linkage model.  11 
 
due to the elimination of the very high export taxes for soybean exports from Argentina 
which becomes a dominant source for oilseed imports into China in the wake of their 
elimination. 
The next two scenarios focus on the impacts of China’s own trade liberalization. 
Scenario 3 (DOM-Ag) eliminates the import tariffs and export taxes and subsidies for China’s 
agricultural goods and lightly-processed foods. In Scenario 4, DOM, the tariff elimination is 
extended to non-agricultural sectors. These two scenarios are intended to show the effects of 
distortions in China’s factor markets. Scenario 5 (LABOR) examines the impact of a 
relaxation of the hukou system such that the ad valorem tax equivalent of the indirect 
transaction costs are reduced from 81 to 34 percent (when evaluated at current levels of 
migration). As noted above, this is the portion of the observed differential in wages that has 
been directly attributed to possession of a hukou certificate. In scenario 6 (LAND), we 
consider the impact of relaxing one of the important barriers to off-farm labor mobility, 
namely, the absence of well-defined property rights for agricultural land. As noted 
previously, this leads to the retention of additional labor in the farm sector. The reason for 
this is that farm households presently tend to include the returns to communal land in their 
decision to work on- or off-farm, since leaving the farm means potentially forgoing rights to 
their farm land. This scenario introduces a land reform such that farm households migrating 
to the city can keep full land returns by renting their land out, and thereby only need consider 
the ratio of the marginal value products of their labor in agriculture and non-farm rural wages 
in deciding where to work.  
In all six scenarios, government real spending and real saving (deflated by the GDP 
deflator) are fixed at their base year levels. Thus the policy reforms are assumed to be 
revenue neutral, with a unified, endogenous factor income tax designed to replace lost 
government tariff revenue. The goal of this tax replacement closure is to avoid unrealistic 
macro-economic effects of tariff removal, while having a relatively neutral impact on 
inequality.  Foreign saving is also fixed in foreign currency terms and the real exchange rate 
adjusts endogenously in order to maintain current account balance. Total investment is 
endogenously adjusted, driven by the changes in households and enterprises savings. 
 
 




In this section we examine the impacts of the above scenarios in turn on the macroeconomy, 
on poverty and inequality, and then on households and sectors. 
 
Macroeconomic effects  
 
The macro-economic results from these simulations are reported in Table 4. We begin by 
focusing on the two scenarios of broad-based commodity trade liberalization (ROW and 
DOM , reported in the first two columns). The elimination of trade distortions in all 
commodity sectors gives a substantial boost to trade in China, with both exports and imports 
rising by more than 5 percent in the unilateral liberalization scenario and by 2-4 percent in 
the scenario of trade liberalization in rest of the world (first two columns of Table 4).  
Aggregate welfare effects, which we proxy by the summation of equivalent variation 
(EV) of individual households and the representative firm,
9 are generally quite small, as one 
would expect in a model with fixed endowments, perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale. Composite EV is projected to increase by 0.5 percent of GDP in the case of trade 
liberalization in rest of the world, due to improved terms of trade. By contrast, there is a 
small deterioration in welfare under unilateral liberalization due to a deterioration in China’s 
terms of trade. This reflects China's relatively low import protection following WTO 
accession, as well as her growing influence in world export markets where trade expansion 
tends to depress export prices.  
With fixed labor endowments and capital stocks, and assuming fixed unemployment and 
no productivity changes, real GDP changes little under both trade liberalization scenarios. 
The small decrease under ROW is driven by the ensuing labor reallocation from non-
agriculture to agriculture. The stronger demand in China’s agricultural exports following 
elimination of trade barriers in the rest of the world diverts the labor force from high-
productivity manufacturing sectors to lower productivity agricultural sectors.
10 As a 
consequence, real GDP declines slightly. This contrasts with China’s unilateral trade 
liberalization, where the elimination of the relatively higher import protection in agricultural 
sectors encourages the movement of the labor force from rural, agricultural sectors to urban, 
non-agricultural activities, leading to an increase in GDP.  
                                                           
9 The EV of the representative firm is calculated based on its utility derived from the part of investment financed by the 
firm’s retained earnings.  
10 In reality, this is likely to be evidenced in the form of slower rates of outmigration from agriculture. 13 
 
As the bottom section of Table 4 indicates, temporary migration from the rural to urban 
sectors slows down as a result of the trade liberalization in rest of the world, which boosts 
economic prospects in agriculture. Under ROW, there are about 5.9 million fewer rural-urban 
migrants in the new equilibrium, as compared to the base year. The larger rural labor force is 
mainly due to the retention of additional on-farm labor (increased by 6.4 million) under the 
ROW scenario. In contrast, China’s unilateral trade liberalization accelerates off-farm 
migration, with about 1.5-1.6 million workers leaving agriculture and migrating to the urban 
areas, relative to the baseline.   
Table 4 also reports changes in factor prices, from which it is clear that trade 
liberalization in rest of the world favors unskilled and semi-skilled labor over skilled labor, 
and rural labor over urban labor. This is due to the relative increase in demand for 
agricultural exports and the rise in the price of competing agricultural imports. Agricultural 
profitability in China is also boosted by the trade reforms in rest of the world, as reflected in 
the rise in returns to agricultural land under ROW. Both returns to capital and skilled wages 
increase less than CPI, which rises by 2.9 percent under ROW. This pattern of changes in 
factor prices contrasts sharply with that obtained under China’s unilateral liberalization, 
wherein returns to capital and skilled wages increase most relative to the CPI while returns to 
agricultural land decrease most.  
Next we turn to the third and fourth columns of macro-economic results reported in 
Table 4, namely, those stemming from the liberalization of agriculture and lightly processed 
food sectors only. Here we see that agricultural liberalization has only modest impacts on 
aggregate exports and imports, reflecting the minor role of agricultural and food sectors in 
China’s total trade (recall Table 1). Consequently, China’s welfare gains from agricultural 
liberalization are trivial, ranging from 0.01 to 0.04 percent of its GDP. In contrast to 
unilateral trade liberalization in all sectors, China’s unilateral agricultural liberalization leads 
to an aggregate EV gain of 0.01 percent of GDP, mainly due to much smaller losses in terms 
of trade. The changes in factor prices induced by agricultural liberalization show similar 
patterns to those of broad-based commodity trade liberalization, i.e. agricultural liberalization 
in the rest of the world would favor unskilled and semi-skilled labor as well as agricultural 
land in China, while China’s unilateral agricultural reforms would favor capital and skilled 
labor which are intensively employed in the relatively lightly protected manufacturing 
sectors. The changes in off-farm employment and rural-urban migration under the two 
agricultural liberalization scenarios are comparable to their corresponding broad-based trade 14 
 
liberalization scenarios, indicating the dominant role played by distortions in agricultural 
sectors in determining the mobility of the rural labor forces in China.  
Compared to the reduction of China’s trade distortions, the labor market reforms 
investigated in scenarios LABOR and LAND generally have larger impacts on welfare, GDP 
and other macroeconomic aggregates. This reflects the large, and persistent, rural-urban 
distortions in China’s labor markets. It is evident from the last two columns of Table 4 that 
both of the factor market reforms serve to increase migration out of the relatively low 
productivity agricultural sector, into the higher productivity non-agricultural sectors, and 
from the rural to urban economy. In the case of land reform, 13.2 million additional workers 
leave agriculture when they are assured of retaining land ownership in the wake of migration 
(LAND scenario, final column, row Farm Labor, in Table 4). These individuals migrate 
initially to the off-farm rural labor market, which in turn releases an additional 12.1 million 
temporary rural migrants to the urban sector in order to restore equality in rural and urban 
wages, net of transactions costs. The release of workers from agriculture tends to depress 
wages in the rural, non-farm economy, where wages fall by 3.9 percent in the case of land 
reform. This wage drop plays a role in dampening out-migration from agriculture.  
 While the LAND reform scenario focuses on the barriers to off-farm mobility of labor, 
the LABOR scenario focuses on rural-urban migration. When the transactions costs associated 
with temporary migration are reduced, due to elimination of the hukou system, rural-urban 
migration expands by 35.7 million workers. Since the transactions costs associated with 
temporary rural-urban migration operate like a tax on rural labor, the first effect of their 
reduction is to increase the supply of rural labor to the urban economy, thereby boosting rural 
wages and depressing urban wages. This represents a redistribution of the rents associated 
with the hukou system from urban to rural households. In addition, by raising rural wages, 
this hukou reform scenario also draws 27.9 million additional workers out of agriculture. 
 
Poverty and inequality impacts  
 
Since poverty and income distribution are central to our study, we provide several related 
measures of inequality and poverty in Table 5. The first column in this table simply reports 
the initial level of each indicator in our data base, while subsequent columns report changes, 
or percentage changes, in these indicators. The initial urban/rural income ratio, at 3.5, is 
higher than in some of the household survey-based studies cited previously. This is largely 15 
 
due to our inability to adjust for spatial price variation which, if fully taken into account, 
would reduce this ratio considerably. The initial Gini coefficient in our model, 0.442, is 
heavily influenced by rural-urban income disparity. This estimate is also consistent with the 
recent work of Benjamin et al. (2007), who identify limitations with many of the existing 
estimates of inequality and place the Gini in the 0.4-0.5 range. 
Using the $2/day poverty line and 1993 PPP exchange rate, the World Bank estimates 
that 58.11 percent of the rural population in China was in poverty and 2.51 percent of the 
urban population was in poverty in 2004.
11 We start with these target rates of poverty and 
compute the poverty line in our data set which reproduces this same poverty headcount. This 
yields a poverty line of 3520 Yuan/person for urban and 2591 Yuan/person for rural areas.  
By assuming a uniform distribution of the population within each of the income vingtiles in 
our source data from NBS, we are able to estimate the poverty headcounts in each stratum. 
This information is also reported in Table 5. As can be seen there, the national poverty 
picture in China is largely driven by rural poverty, with 455 million poor residing in rural 
areas. The poverty headcount rate is highest in the agriculture-dependent household group, 
where nearly two thirds (63.7 percent) of the population is poor. 
Turning to the reform scenarios, the two scenarios that do not reduce the rural-urban 
income disparity are DOM and DOM-Ag (China’s unilateral liberalization), as rural 
households generally lose from declining agricultural factor returns. Although the magnitude 
of the change in the rural-urban income ratio is very small in the cases of trade liberalization, 
it is very substantial in the factor market reform scenarios. In the case where the hukou 
registration system is abolished (LABOR), for example, this ratio declines from 3.54 to 3.23. 
The decline for the land reform scenario (LAND) is also large (0.17 points).  
Table 5 also reports the absolute changes in several Gini coefficients. As income 
inequality in China is dominated by urban-rural inequality, the narrowed urban-rural income 
gaps under scenarios of trade liberalization in the rest of the world and reforms in factor 
markets are reflected in an improvement in overall inequality, as measured by the national 
Gini coefficient. There are no discernible changes in inequality within the urban and rural 
areas under the scenarios of unilateral liberalization. However, under the two factor market 
reform scenarios, the Gini coefficients show a slight increase in inequality within urban areas 
and a slight decline within rural areas. This is because the low-income, unskilled labor 
dependent urban households are hurt most by the increase in rural-urban migration of 
                                                           
11 The World Bank’s poverty estimates are available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp 16 
 
unskilled workers under labor market reforms, whereas low-income, diversified rural 
households gain more from the resulting increase in rural unskilled wages than those at high 
income levels.  
Next we turn to the changes in poverty as a consequence of the reform scenarios. In the 
scenario of broad-based trade liberalization in the rest of the world (ROW), the monetary 
poverty line increases by 2.9 percent, following the change in CPI (Table 4). Nevertheless, 
higher factor earnings mean that the poverty headcount ratio declines for all household 
groups with significant poverty. Urban poverty decreases by 0.3 million (bottom panel 
reports poverty change in millions) while rural households enjoy a 1.9 percentage point 
reduction in the poverty headcount (the middle panel reports percentage point change in 
poverty). Given the large population base in rural China, this translates into a rural poverty 
reduction of 14.6 million. In the case of agricultural liberalization in the rest of the world, the 
poverty reduction is smaller but still significant, with the rural poverty headcount declining 
by 10.8 million.   
Given the adverse impacts of China’s unilateral liberalization on agricultural sectors, 
rural poverty increases slightly, by 3.5 million, in the DOM scenario and 2.4 million in the 
scenario of DOM-Ag. Given the predominance of rural poverty in China, these rises in rural 
poverty, in turn, translate into comparable changes in total poverty. On the other hand, labor 
market reforms would significantly reduce rural poverty, but slightly increase urban poverty.  
The rural poverty headcount ratio declines from 58.1 percent in the base year to 51.0 percent 
in the LABOR scenario and 56.2 percent in the LAND scenario, while the urban headcount 
ratio rises slightly, from 2.5 percent to 2.8-3.2 percent. Overall, the share of the national 
population that is impoverished falls quite sharply in the case of hukou reforms, from 36.4 
percent of the total population to 32.3 percent under the LABOR scenario (hukou reforms) 
and to 35.4 percent under the LAND reform scenario. When combined, these two scenarios 
together generate a poverty reduction of 65.5 million. Thus it is clear that, if a poverty 
reduction and greater income equality are the objectives of the next round of reforms in 




It is important to dig down below the aggregate indicators of poverty and inequality and 
consider the disaggregated, household incidence curves reported in Figures 1a - 1f. These 17 
 
report the percentage change in welfare (EV as a percentage of initial income), by stratum, 
across the income-vingtile spectrum. The largest increases in welfare following both trade 
and agricultural liberalization in ROW (on the order to 2 percent) accrue to the agriculture-
specialized households (Figure 1a and Figure 1b). These households benefit from the fact that 
returns to agricultural land increase relative to other factor prices. Real incomes rise less for 
rural diversified households due to the dominance of non-farm wage earnings in their income 
portfolio. Amongst the urban households, the largest welfare increases in Figure 1a are 
associated with labor-specialized households, followed by urban diversified households. This 
is consistent with the larger increases in wage rates than in returns to capital. Because the 
transfers are held constant in real terms, and transfers make up most of their income, the real 
income of the transfer group is little affected by the agricultural reform. However, as 
households at low income levels tend to have a larger proportion of food consumption in their 
total expenditure, the relative increase of food prices leads to a higher household-specific CPI 
for these low-income households relative to the national average CPI, causing the modest 
welfare losses of the lowest income transfer groups.  
China’s unilateral trade liberalization hurts all households except urban transfer 
specialized households, as shown in Figure 1c, although the magnitude of their welfare losses 
is small. Rural agriculture-specialized households experience the largest welfare losses, 
followed by rural diversified households, as they suffer from depressed returns to agricultural 
activity. The welfare losses of urban households are very small, amounting to only around 
0.1-0.2 percent of household income for both diversified households and labor-specialized 
households. The increased income tax rate to replace tariff revenue loss is the major factor 
contributing to the welfare losses of urban households. In the case of China’s unilateral 
agricultural liberalization, rural households are still the major losers, but all urban households 
gain slightly because of the smaller tax replacement effects associated with a lower loss in 
tariff revenue (Figure 1d).    
Recall from the preceding discussion that the largest poverty and inequality impacts stem 
from the hukou reform. Figure 1e shows why this is true. The population stratum with the 
highest poverty headcount, the agriculture-specialized households, is also the one to reap the 
largest proportionate gains under this labor market reform scenario. They benefit from the 
significant increase in agricultural wages. The diversified rural households also benefit from 
the rise in rural wages, although their welfare gains are somewhat less. These households 
supply less of the temporary migrant labor to urban areas. And it is these migrants who bear 18 
 
the direct burden of the heightened transactions costs owing to the hukou system. When this 
is eliminated, they are the ones who benefit most directly from their absence. While the 
benefits from hukou reform are spread relatively evenly across income levels within each of 
the rural strata, the higher income households within the diversified strata – which have more 
capital earnings in their income – tend to experience smaller proportionate gains, thereby 
contributing to the decrease in the Gini coefficient within the rural sector.  
Most urban households suffer from the influx of additional unskilled and semi-skilled 
rural migrants, the presence of which drags down the wage rates in the urban areas. Almost 
all urban households experience welfare losses, with the minor exception of the richest 
transfer specialized households. Overall, the urban index of income inequality worsens 
slightly. However, this is overwhelmed by the reduction in between-sector, rural-urban 
inequality, and, when coupled with the decline in rural inequality, this leads to a decline in 
the national Gini inequality index of 0.021 (from 0.442 to 0.421). This is a substantial 
movement in an index which is generally quite robust to policy reforms. 
Similar to the hukou reform, the largest gains from land reform accrue to the agriculture-
specialized, rural households (Figure 1f). These are the households that are currently 
constrained to remain active on the farm if they wish to retain rights to their land. By 
permitting some of these households to rent the land and migrate to the city if they wish to do 
so, land market reform raises the shadow value of the labor remaining in agriculture very 
substantially across all income levels. The diversified rural households also gain, with some 
of the highest gains coming at the lowest income levels, where households are more heavily 
reliant on income from agriculture. Urban household welfare falls across the board in this 
experiment and it falls most for the poorest households. This is due to the large boost to rural-
urban migration of unskilled and semi-skilled labor as well as the increase in food prices 
following the reduction in the agricultural labor force. As a consequence, the urban Gini 
index rises. However, from the point of view of overall inequality in China, the main 
consequence of this experiment is to redistribute income from urban to rural households, 
which lowers the Gini index by 0.008. 
 
Sectoral impacts  
 
The effects of the investigated policy reforms on six aggregated sectors’ output, exports and 
imports are reported in Table 6. The first row of Table 6 shows that the highly processed food 19 
 
products are the major gainers from the elimination of market distortions in rest of the world, 
with an average output expansion of 5.4 percent. The agriculture and lightly processed food 
sector expands production by 1.7 percent. Strong increases in exports are the key drivers of 
the expansion of China’s food and agricultural sectors, flowing from the strong increase in 
international demand. Exports of China’s agricultural products, lightly processed food and 
highly processed food increase by 72 percent, 31 percent and 65 percent, respectively, under 
the scenario ROW. Despite the absence of any cut in protection for agriculture under the 
ROW scenario, China’s agricultural and food imports increase by around 10 percent 
following the agricultural liberalization in rest of the world, because of the decline in the 
world prices of some of China’s major agricultural importing goods such as oilseeds and 
vegetable oils. In addition, there is a real appreciation of China’s currency which tends to 
boost the demand for imports across the board. 
If ROW liberalization is confined to the agriculture and lightly-processed food sectors, 
they are the only two aggregate sectors with expanding exports and output. All the other 
aggregate sectors experience declining output and exports. The impact of agricultural 
liberalization in the rest of the world on China’s imports is modest in comparison with the 
broad-based trade liberalization, as the decline in total exports, and a depreciation of real 
exchange rate, both serve to dampen the expansion of imports in this ROW-Agr scenario. 
The sectoral impacts of China’s own reforms suggest that the current distortions arising 
from China’s tariff protection and the labor market barriers generally support the size of 
agriculture relative to other industries. Under all four scenarios involving China’s own 
reforms, agriculture experiences output losses while both the non-food manufacturing sector 
and services expand. The impacts of reducing China’s distortions in commodity and factor 
markets on highly processed food sectors are mixed: this sector benefits from the elimination 
of import tariffs, but loses from reforms in factor markets.  
In the two scenarios involving liberalization in the rest of the world, the disaggregated 
changes in sectoral output (not shown) generally follow that of changes in export demand 
reported in Table 3: the sectors with larger increases (decreases) in export demand and higher 
export dependence, such as prepared fish products, sugar, textiles, and apparel and leather, 
experience relatively large increases (decreases) in output.  But imports also play a role in 
determining sectoral output changes in the oilseeds sector, where output shrinks by 7.4 
percent in the ROW scenario as a result of the 2.8 percent decline in import prices which 
spurs the growth of its imports.  20 
 
Under China’s unilateral trade liberalization (DOM), instruments, electronics, textiles, 
apparel and leather are major manufacturing sectors with rapid output expansion. As the most 
export oriented sectors, they benefit from the real depreciation of Chinese currency in the 
wake of China’s unilateral trade liberalization. At the other end of the spectrum, the most 
heavily protected sectors, with sizable trade exposure, experience declining output, including: 
oilseeds, sugar, transportation equipment, other grains and vegetable oil. In the case of 
China’s unilateral agricultural liberalization, there are large output contractions in the 
agricultural sectors with high levels of protection.  
In the scenarios of hukou reform (reduced transactions costs) and land reform, 
agricultural output falls sharply, as the farm labor force is diverted to off-farm rural activities 
as well as urban-based manufacturing sectors. Within manufacturing, the consumption goods 
sectors experience declining output but most capital goods sectors expand, because the 
changes in final demand favor investment over consumption in these two scenarios. 
 
Sensitivity of results to the land rental market assumption 
 
As noted previously, China’s rural land markets have been undergoing reform and a nascent 
market for land is emerging in many areas. In principle, this should facilitate off-farm 
migration, as migrants may no longer risk losing control of this asset when they leave the 
farm. However, to date these reforms have been restricted to certain regions, and it is not 
clear how efficiently this market is functioning – even in those special cases. Therefore, in 
our base case results, we assumed that the transfer of rural labor from farm to off-farm 
activities would diminish earnings from land rents by 50 percent, on average (that is, there is 
a 50 percent probability that migrants will lose control of their land). Since this parameter 
choice is somewhat arbitrary, we contrast the base case results with those from the two 
extreme assumptions about the functioning of rural land rental market: one in which there is 
zero loss in land returns following off-farm employment, and the other in which there is no 
land rental market (100 percent loss in land returns if farmers switch to off-farm jobs). 
Thereupon we repeat the two trade liberalization scenarios, ROW and DOM. The key 
simulation results are presented in Table 7. Since the macro aggregate results are essentially 
unchanged from our base line results, only revised results on factor prices and labor 
migration are reported.  
The first pair of columns in Table 7 report the results when the land market is fully 21 
 
absent, so that migration results in the loss of all land farmed by the migrant. The second pair 
of columns reports the results when the opposite assumption is made, namely, a fully 
functioning land market. Consider first the case of trade reforms in the rest of the world 
(ROW). Here, both the returns to land and wage rates in agriculture rise. Furthermore, the rise 
in land returns is greater than the rise in wages. Therefore, households that had hitherto been 
considering leaving agriculture due to depressed factor returns have an even stronger 
incentive to continue do devote their labor to agriculture than do those who, at the margin, 
had been indifferent to the wage differential between the farm and non-farm sectors (fully 
functioning land market). Thus the movement of labor into agriculture in the ROW scenario is 
greater when the land market is not functioning than when it is, provided there is no change 
in the underlying structure of the land market.  
The same situation applies, but in reverse, in the case of unilateral trade reforms when 
labor is leaving agriculture. Here, by including returns to land in the off-farm migration 
decision(since these fall by more than wages), the incentive to work off-farm is accentuated 
in the absence of a land market. As we saw above, moving from no land market to a fully 
functioning land market (experiment LAND) generates a much larger flow of workers from 
agriculture to the rest of the economy (more than 13 million), and a significant poverty 
reduction. So we are not concluding that a poorly functioning land market is good for poverty 
reduction. Since the impact of land reforms dominates the trade reform impacts on labor 
markets, it is the former that rules the day if both are undertaken together. However, this 
sensitivity analysis does show that our predictions about the impact of trade reforms on 
intersectoral labor mobility depend importantly on the extent to which farmers are able to 
lease their land when migrating to the city for work.  
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
 
Absolute poverty in China is now largely a rural problem and, within the rural sector, the 
intensity of poverty is greatest on the farm. Thus policy reforms that either boost returns to 
farming or enhance off-farm opportunities for those presently working in agriculture offer the 
best prospects for reducing poverty and inequality in China. Of the reforms considered, trade 
reforms in the rest of the world, land reform and hukou reform all serve to reduce poverty in 22 
 
China, while unilateral trade reforms result in a small poverty increase. Domestic agricultural 
distortions are important factors in determining the distributional and poverty effects of trade 
reform packages, although their impacts on aggregate trade and welfare are small. 
Furthermore, the ROW trade reforms as well as the land and hukou reforms tend to favor 
rural over urban households, while the opposite is true of the unilateral tariff reforms. So it 
would seem desirable to bundle these reforms together in such a way that all of these broad 
household groups stand to benefit from the reform package. For example, by combining the 
ROW and domestic trade reforms, a policy package is obtained that would reduce both 
poverty and inequality while benefitting all of the household groups in our study.  
  Turning to domestic policies, both the land reform and the hukou reform scenarios 
benefit rural areas much more strongly than urban ones. In the case of land reform, these may 
hurt lower income urban households who currently benefit from the artificial restriction of 
rural-urban labor mobility. That may be avoided though if these reforms are phased in over 
time: in the context of continued rapid economic growth in urban and coastal regions, those 
urban losses are likely to be more than offset by ongoing income growth. Indeed, this is what 
appears to be happening in many regions of China, where restrictions on labor mobility are 
being eroded and land markets are emerging. This study suggests that such labor and land 
market reforms are particularly impressive in their potential for reducing inequality and rural 
poverty in China, as well as their scope for allowing China to better realize the potential of 
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Figure 1: Impacts of prospective liberalizations on five types of Chinese households  
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Agriculture 6.5  0.8  13.4  1.6  2.5 
  Paddy rice  0.0  -1.0  0.8  0.0  0.0 
  Wheat  4.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1 
  Other grains  3.4  13.0  0.3  0.1  0.0 
  Vegetables and fruits  14.8  0.0  5.5  0.7  0.1 
  Oilseeds  15.9  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.7 
  Sugar cane and beet  15.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Plant-based fibers  -5.3  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3 
  Other crops  9.4  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.0 
  Cattle sheep etc  3.9  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0 
  Other livestock  0.0  0.0  2.7  0.1  0.2 
  Raw milk  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
  Wool  7.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
  Forestry   2.8  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.9 
  Fishing   5.2  0.0  1.3  0.1  0.0 
Mining  0.7 0.0  4.9  1.5  6.2 
  Coal mining        3.1  0.0  1.9  0.5  0.1 
  Crude oil and natural gas   0.9  0.0  1.9  0.4  4.1 
  Ore mining  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.1  1.4 
  Other mining  0.5  0.0  0.6  0.5  0.7 
Food manufacturing  5.0  -0.0  3.8  3.0  2.0 
  Meat Products  10.5  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.3 
  Vegetable oils          12.5  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.5 
  Grain, milled  0.0  -1.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 
  Sugar, refined               17.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
  Forage  11.5  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 
  Prepared fish products   0.9  0.0  0.2  1.0  0.7 
  Other processed food   9.4  0.0  0.8  1.1  0.3 
  Beverages   12.7  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.1 
  Tobacco products   8.9  0.0  1.1  0.1  0.1 
Non-food manufacturing  2.9 0.0  28.6  74.9  80.5 
  Textiles   0.2  0.0  2.0  9.1  4.5 
  Apparel and leather      0.2  0.0  1.5  9.3  1.6 
  Sawmills and furniture          1.9  0.0  0.9  2.2  0.7 
  Paper, printing, etc.        3.0  0.0  2.0  3.3  2.0 
  Petroleum refining       3.6  0.0  0.9  0.9  1.5 
  Chemicals          3.3  0.0  4.9  7.3  13.0 
  Build materials          2.7  0.0  1.6  1.4  0.7 
  Metals   1.7  0.0  3.1  1.5  5.9 
  Metal products   2.1  0.0  1.2  3.6  2.0 
  Machinery   3.3  0.0  3.1  4.4  11.6 
  Transport equipment  16.4  0.0  2.1  2.2  3.7 33 
 
  Electric machinery  2.9  0.0  1.5  6.8  6.2 
  Electronics   1.4  0.0  2.3  16.6  20.7 
  Instruments   2.1  0.0  0.4  5.0  6.0 
  Other manufacturing goods  0.7  0.0  1.2  1.4  0.4 
Utilities, construct., services  0.0  0.0  49.3  19.0  8.8 
 
a Negative figures indicate an export tax. 
 
Source: Huang, Rozelle and Martin (2009), drawing on the GTAP database v7.0 and China’s 
2002 Social Accounting Matrix. 34 
 




ROW-Ag  Agricultural liberalization in the rest of the world 
-  Elimination of production taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sectors 
-  Elimination of export taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sectors 
-  Elimination of import tariffs in agricultural and lightly processed food 
sector sectors 
 
ROW  All merchandise trade liberalization in the rest of the world 
-  Elimination of production taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sectors  
-  Elimination of export taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sectors 
-  Elimination of import tariffs in all sectors 
 
DOM-Ag  Agricultural liberalization in China 
-  Elimination of export taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sectors 
-  Elimination of import tariffs in agricultural and lightly processed food 
sectors 
 
DOM  All merchandise trade liberalization in China 
-  Elimination of export taxes and subsidies in agricultural and lightly 
processed food sector 
-  Elimination of import tariffs in all sectors 
 
LABOR  Relaxation of the hukou system 
-  Cut the indirect transactions costs from 81 to 34 percent of the non-farm 
rural wage 
 
LAND  Introduction of land reform 
-  Farm households do not include the returns to land in their temporal 
migration decision  
 
 
Source: Authors’ specifications.35 
 





Elimination of all trade 
distortions in ROW  
Elimination of agricultural 














Agriculture:            
Paddy  rice  94.9 4.2  ..  123.6 1.8   
Wheat  15.5 3.5 2.8  45.8 1.4 3.6 
Other  grains  105.1 3.9 6.5  157.7 1.6 6.5 
Vegetables and fruits  185.5  4.2  1.9  232.9  1.8  1.6 
Oilseeds  10.3 4.0  -2.8  42.9 1.7  -2.3 
Sugar cane and beet  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Plant-based  fibers  30.0 3.3  10.0  51.4 1.3  11.5 
Other  crops  -12.7 4.5 1.3  8.4 2.0 1.5 
Cattle sheep etc  -18.6  4.4  6.5  -3.1  1.9  6.6 
Other  livestock  -20.8 3.8 0.7  -0.2 1.6 1.6 
Raw  milk  -48.3 4.1  -1.8  -31.7 1.7  -0.7 
Wool  -13.1 3.8 4.9  10.1 1.6 4.9 
Other primary products  -7.8 2.7 0.5  2.0 0.6 1.1 
Lightly processed food:         
Meat  products  29.2 3.5 4.9  56.3 1.3 5.6 
Vegetable  oils  -6.4 1.8  -0.2  5.7 0.3  -0.9 
Grain,  milled  148.8 3.0 4.2  192.1 0.9 3.4 
Sugar,  refined  410.2 3.0 1.4  560.4 0.8 2.0 
Highly processed food  67.3 2.9 0.8  -14.1 0.8  -0.2 
Non-food manufacturing:         
Textiles; apparel and leather  13.7  2.6  -0.2  -2.1  0.8  0.4 
Other manufacturing sectors  -3.3  2.2  0.7  -1.6  0.5  0.3 
Services  -10.5 2.5 0.1  -0.9 0.5 0.2 
Total  2.2 2.4 0.6  -0.3 0.6 0.4 
 
Source: Linkage model simulations (see van der Mensbrugghe, Valenzuela and Anderson 
2009).  36 
 
Table 4: Aggregate simulation results of prospective liberalizations for China  
 
  ROW DOM  ROW-Ag  DOM-Ag  LABOR  LAND 
Macroeconomy 
(percent change) 
        
Welfare (EV)  0.5  -0.1  0.04  0.01  1.0  0.1 
Real GDP  -0.1  0.2  -0.2  0.1  0.8  0.3 
Exports 1.9  5.8  -0.3  0.7  1.6  0.6 
Imports 4.3  5.5  0.1  0.7  1.4  0.6 
Terms of trade  1.8  -0.8  0.3  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1 
CPI 2.9  -0.9  1.0  -0.3  1.4  0.7 
            
Factor prices (percent)          
Return to agric land  16.3  -3.5  13.5  -3.1  -7.3  -2.5 
Return to capital  2.2  -0.8  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.6 
Unskilled wages:             
  Urban  3.7  -1.1  1.2  -0.3  -17.7  -3.1 
  Rural non-agric  3.9  -1.3  1.3  -0.4  6.9  -3.9 
  Agricultural  4.4  -1.8  1.3  -0.4  23.7  8.8 
Semi-skilled wages:             
  Urban  3.9  -1.2  1.3  -0.3  -5.4  -3.1 
  Rural non-agric  4.9  -1.1  2.2  -0.4  25.5  -4.5 
  Agricultural  2.7  -1.1  0.0  0.0  20.1  11.7 
Skilled wages:             
  Urban  1.9  -0.9  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.3 
  Rural non-agric  1.9  -1.0  -0.1  0.0  0.9  0.2 
            
Labor force (millions)          
Farm labor:   6.4  -1.6  5.7  -1.5  -27.9  -13.2 
   Unskilled  0.7  -0.2  0.6  -0.2  -15.6  -1.8 
   Semi-skill  5.7  -1.4  5.1  -1.3  -12.3  -11.3 
Rural-urban temporary 
migration: -5.9  1.5  -5.3  1.4  35.7  12.1 
   Unskilled  -0.6  0.1  -0.5  0.1  18.2  1.5 
   Semi-skill  -5.3  1.3  -4.8  1.3  17.6  10.6 
   Skilled   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Labor force (percent)          
Farm labor:   1.7  -0.4  1.6  -0.4  -7.6  -3.6 
   Unskilled  0.4  -0.1  0.4  -0.1  -9.8  -1.2 
   Semi-skill  2.7  -0.7  2.4  -0.6  -5.9  -5.4 
Rural-urban temporary 
migration: -6.0  1.5  -5.4  1.4  36.5  12.3 
   Unskilled  -1.5  0.4  -1.4  0.4  46.7  3.9 
   Semi-skill  -10.4  2.6  -9.3  2.5  34.3  20.6 
   Skilled   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Source: Authors’ Chinese CGE model simulations. 37 
 
Table 5: Effects of prospective liberalizations on inequality and poverty in China 
  
  Base  ROW DOM  ROW-Ag DOM-Ag LABOR  LAND 
Inequality      
Urban/rural 
income ratio  3.538 -0.052  0.009  -0.042  0.010 -0.303  -0.167 
Gini coefficient  0.442 -0.005  0.001  -0.004  0.001 -0.021  -0.008 
  Urban  0.259  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.006 0.003 
  Rural  0.315 -0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.000 -0.008  -0.003 
      
Poverty 
headcount 
($2/day)    
 
  (ratio, %)  Changes (percentage point)   
Total  36.4  -1.2 0.3  -0.8 0.2  -4.1  -1.0 
Urban  2.5  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.7 0.3 
 -- transfer 
specialized  0.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
 -- labor 
specialized  4.0  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.9 0.4 
 -- diversified  1.6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.6 0.3 
Rural  58.1  -1.9 0.5  -1.4 0.3  -7.1  -1.9 
 --ag-specialized  63.6  -1.8 0.4  -1.4 0.3  -6.8  -3.5 
 -- diversified  57.5  -1.9  0.5 -1.4  0.3  -7.1 -1.7 
  (million 
persons) 
 
Changes (million persons) 
 
Total  467.3 -14.9  3.6  -10.8  2.3  -52.1  -13.4 
Urban  12.6  -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0  3.3  1.6 
 -- transfer 
specialized  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
 -- labor 
specialized  8.1  -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0  1.7  0.9 
 -- diversified  4.4  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.6  0.8 
Rural  454.7 -14.6  3.5  -10.8  2.4  -55.5  -15.0 
 --ag-specialized  52.2 -1.5  0.4  -1.1  0.3  -5.6  -2.9 
 -- diversified  402.5 -13.1  3.2  -9.7  2.1  -49.9  -12.1 
 
Source: Authors’ Chinese CGE model simulations.38 
 




  ROW DOM  ROW-Ag  DOM-Ag  LABOR  LAND 
Output        
Agriculture  1.7 -0.3  1.6 -0.4 -2.9 -1.3 
Other  primary  goods  -0.8 -0.1 -0.2  0.1 -0.8 -0.5 
Lightly  processed  food  1.7 -2.0  1.7 -2.2 -2.6 -1.1 
Highly  processed  food  5.4 0.03 -1.6 0.44 -2.3 -1.1 
Non-food  manufacturing  -0.5 0.4  -0.9 0.3 2.0 0.9 
Services  -0.4 0.2  -0.2 0.1 1.3 0.5 
Exports           
Agriculture  71.5 5.7  100.2 3.0  -39.2  -23.6 
Other  primary  goods  -6.0 5.6 1.7 0.6 3.7 1.3 
Lightly processed food  31.2  11.0  58.3  7.7  -25.0  -14.4 
Highly processed food  64.8  7.0  -14.8  2.8  -17.4  -9.6 
Non-food  manufacturing  1.6 6.4  -2.1 0.7 3.0 1.4 
Services  -10.2 2.7  -1.2 0.3 2.1 1.1 
Imports           
Agriculture  11.6 21.0  1.2 22.1 18.6  9.8 
Other  primary  goods  5.5 1.2  -2.4  -0.1 6.9 3.0 
Lightly  processed  food  8.8 46.4 -0.1 48.6 10.3  5.8 
Highly  processed  food  8.8  16.3 3.5  -0.9 8.0 4.3 
Non-food  manufacturing  3.9 5.7 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Services  4.8  -1.2 0.3  -0.1 0.4 0.1 
 
Source: Authors’ Chinese CGE model simulations. 
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Table 7:  Sensitivity analysis of simulation results for China 
 
 




  ROW DOM ROW DOM 
Factor prices (percent)      
Return to agric land  16.8  -3.6  15.8  -3.4 
Return to capital  2.1  -0.7  2.2  -0.8 
Unskilled wages:         
  Urban  4.0  -1.1  3.4  -1.0 
  Rural non-agric  4.3  -1.3  3.5  -1.3 
  Agricultural  3.5  -1.3  5.3  -1.8 
Semi-skilled wages:         
  Urban  4.4  -1.3  3.5  -1.1 
  Rural non-agric  5.6  -1.1  4.1  -1.1 
  Agricultural  1.5  -0.8  4.2  -1.5 
Skilled wages:         
  Urban  1.8  -0.9  1.9  -0.9 
  Rural non-agric  1.7  -1.0  1.9  -1.0 
        
Labor force (millions)      
Farm labor:   8.0  -1.9  4.7  -1.3 
   Unskilled  0.8  -0.2  0.5  -0.1 
   Semi-skill  7.2  -1.7  4.2  -1.1 
Rural-urban temporary 
migration: -7.4  1.7  -4.4  1.2 
   Unskilled  -0.7  0.2  -0.4  0.1 
   Semi-skill  -6.7  1.6  -4.0  1.1 
   Skilled   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Source: Authors’ Chinese CGE model simulations. 40 
 
 Appendix Table A.1: Sectoral concordance between Chinese CGE model and Linkage model 
 
Chinese model  Linkage model 
Agriculture   
Paddy rice  Paddy rice 
Wheat Wheat 
Other grains  Other grains 
Vegetables and fruits  Vegetables and fruits 
Oilseeds Oilseeds 
Sugar cane and beet  Sugar cane and beet 
Plant-based fibers  Plant-based fibers 
Other crops  Other crops 
Cattle sheep etc  Cattle sheep etc 
Other livestock  Other livestock 
Raw milk  Raw milk 
Wool Wool 
Lightly processed food   
Meat Products  Beef and sheep meat; Other meats 
Vegetable oils  Vegetable oils and fats 
Grain, milled   Processed rice 
Sugar, refined  Refined sugar 
Highly processed food   
Forage; Prepared fish products; Other processed food; 
Beverages; Tobacco 
Dairy products; Other food, beverages 
and tobacco 
Other primary products   
Forestry; Fishing; Coal mining; Crude oil and natural 
gas; Ore mining; Other mining 
Other primary products 
Non-food manufacturing   
Textiles, Apparel and leather  Textiles and wearing apparel 
Sawmills and furniture; Paper, printing & social 
articles; Petroleum refining; Chemicals; Build 
materials; Metals; Metal products; Machinery; 
Transport equipment; Electric machinery; Electronics; 
Instruments; Other manufacturing goods 
Other manufacturing 
Services   
Utility; Construction; Transportation & 
communication; Commerce; Finance; Other services 
Services 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation41 
 
Table A.2: Impacts on prospective liberalizations on sectoral output, China 
 
(percentage deviation from baseline) 
 
  ROW DOM  ROW-Ag  DOM-Ag  LABOR  LAND 
Paddy rice  1.3 0.4 0.1 0.4  -1.5  -0.7 
Wheat  -0.1 -0.7  0.8 -1.1 -4.6 -2.4 
Other grains  5.8 -4.4  6.8 -4.7 -3.4 -2.0 
Vegetables  and  fruits  3.5 0.1 3.6 0.0  -2.2  -0.6 
Oilseeds  -7.4 -13.4  -3.4 -14.1 -12.2  -6.5 
Sugar cane and beet  6.5 -5.8  6.5 -5.9 -2.2 -0.7 
Plant-based  fibers  4.7 2.6 2.0 1.0  -3.0  -1.5 
Other  crops  -6.2 0.8  -0.8 0.0  -19.1  -10.6 
Cattle  sheep  etc  -1.5 -0.9 -0.1  0.2 -5.5 -2.9 
Other  livestock  1.8 0.3 0.1 0.0  -1.3  -0.7 
Raw  milk  -0.3  0.3 -0.3  0.4 -2.9 -1.5 
Wool  1.4  0.5 -0.8  0.3 -0.9 -0.5 
Forestry    3.5  0.6 -0.4 -1.2 -2.8 -1.5 
Fishing    3.5  0.3 -1.1  0.2 -6.6 -3.3 
Coal mining        -0.9  0.1  -0.2  0.1  1.9  0.8 
Crude oil and natural gas   -2.5  -0.7  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.2 
Ore  mining  -3.5 0.3  -0.2 0.2 3.7 1.6 
Other  mining  -1.8 0.7 0.0 0.2 3.6 1.5 
Meat  Products  1.1 0.1 0.2 0.2  -1.5  -0.3 
Vegetable oils          0.7  0.2  -0.4  0.4  -3.1  -1.6 
Grain,  milled  -1.1 -4.3 -2.0 -4.4 -2.4 -0.9 
Sugar, refined               8.7  -7.8  8.9  -7.9  -2.2  -0.8 
Forage              3.2  -0.5  4.9  -1.1  -4.0  -2.1 
Prepared fish products   22.6  1.9  -5.3  0.6  -13.8  -7.4 
Other processed food         6.2  0.0  -2.1  0.8  -1.8  -0.8 
Beverage            1.7  -0.3  -0.7  0.2  0.3  0.3 
Tobacco             2.2  -0.7  -0.6  0.1  0.1  0.3 
Textiles             5.1  3.5  -2.2  0.9  0.2  -0.1 
Apparel and leather      6.2  2.8  -1.3  0.9  0.7  0.2 
Sawmills and furniture          -1.4  1.0  -0.8  0.2  -0.2  -0.3 
Paper,  printing,  etc.    -1.5 0.4  -0.9 0.2 1.6 0.8 
Petroleum refining       -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  0.0  0.8  0.3 
Chemicals          -1.3  -0.5  -0.7  0.2  1.2  0.6 
Build materials          -0.5  0.4  -0.5  0.1  2.6  1.0 
Metals    -1.7  -0.5  -0.8 0.2 3.0 1.3 
Metal  products    -1.6 0.7  -0.9 0.2 3.3 1.5 
Machinery    -1.4  -1.2  -0.7 0.1 2.9 1.2 
Transport  equipment  -0.9  -5.2  -0.5 0.1 2.2 0.9 
Electric  machinery  -2.3 0.9  -1.0 0.2 3.6 1.7 
Electronics      -1.5  3.8  -0.9  0.2  3.0  1.5 
Instruments      -1.8  7.1  -1.6  0.4  5.8  2.8 
Other  manufacturing  goods  -1.5 0.6  -0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 
Utility  -0.6 0.1  -0.3 0.1 1.3 0.5 
Construction  0.4 0.1  -0.2 0.1 2.1 0.6 
Transportation & commun.  -1.0 0.3  -0.4 0.1 1.5 0.7 
Commerce  -0.9 0.3  -0.5 0.1 1.3 0.6 
Finance  -0.3 0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.3 
Other services  -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 
 
Source: Authors’ Chinese CGE model simulations. 